We Can't Count on Repairing All Failures Going to Mars by Jones, Harry W.
46th International Conference on Environmental Systems ICES-2016-113 
10-14 July 2016, Vienna, Austria 
We Can’t Count on Repairing All Failures Going to Mars 
Harry W. Jones1 
NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, 94035-0001 
Reliability analysis often assumes that a complex system can be kept operating 
indefinitely with scheduled maintenance and emergency repair using a stock of spare parts, 
as long as the spare parts are not depleted. This assumption seems justified for well-tested, 
widely used, long operational systems with a multigenerational history of failure, redesign, 
and reliability growth. It seems doubtful that newer, relatively untried, high technology 
space systems can always be repaired. We cannot assume space systems will have a low rate 
of random failures that can all be repaired with a few identical spares. New untried systems 
usually have a high initial failure rate, called infant mortality, due to errors in requirements, 
design, parts, materials, and operations planning. These problems can cause groups of 
related failures called Common Cause Failures (CCFs). The practical definition of a CCF is 
any failure mode that cannot be cured using identical redundant systems or spare parts. 
Systems with CCFs may fail repeatedly for the same reason. Can a life support system be 
kept operating on the way to Mars using only redundant systems and spare parts? The 
failure history of International Space Station (ISS) life support systems suggests that CCFs 
are likely to occur and will probably require design changes rather than being reparable 
with spare parts.  
Nomenclature 
CCF = Common Cause Failures 
cdf = cumulative distribution function 
H2 = Hydrogen  
ISS = International Space Station  
MTBF = Mean Time Before Failure 
OGA = Oxygen Generation Assembly 
ORU = Orbital Replacement Unit 
pdf = probability distribution function 
TOC = Total Organic Carbon 
I. Introduction 
HIS paper challenges a common optimistic assumption in reliability analysis that all system failures can be 
repaired using spare parts. If we assume that failures are random and independent, and that we know the 
component failure rates, a simple calculation tells us how many spares are needed to achieve any high level of 
reliability. But what if the system is damaged due to accident, fire, explosion, or toxic contamination? What if a 
design error or deficient material causes all the spare parts to quickly fail? Is it possible that, on the journey to Mars, 
the life support system will have a serious problem that cannot be repaired? This paper develops logical arguments, 
describes reliability models, and investigates International Space Station (ISS) life support failure data to show that 
we can’t count on repairing all failures going to Mars. 
II. Discussion of failure and repair 
Logical considerations show that it is difficult to achieve high reliability simply by repairing systems using spare 
parts.  
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A. The total reparability assumption is wrong 
Assume a mission uses a variety of hardware systems, that it has a maintenance and repair approach that is well 
developed and implemented, and that this approach includes the capability to repair or replace or tolerate failure in 
all the systems. Then if a failure occurs and is traced to a system or component, the options would be to repair, 
replace, or ignore the failed system or component. For example, if one of three redundant on-line sensors failed, it 
could be repaired, replaced, or ignored. Robust systems can sometimes use operational slack to avoid repairs, but 
most systems should be restored to their nominal condition. Large critical systems, such as regenerative life support, 
must be kept operating nearly continually. If a system or subsystem has failed and been replaced, the failed unit 
should be repaired in case of future need.  
The key assumption here is that all seriously failed systems can be replaced or repaired using spares, and that the 
replacement or repaired systems will work as expected. This is justified by the further assumption that the failures 
are random and independent, unpredictable and uncorrelated. This is too strong an assumption. Many failures are not 
random and uncorrelated. Some, often many failures are due to specification errors, design mistakes, manufacturing 
problems, and operational errors. All these are built into or equally affect all the identical redundant systems and 
spare parts. They are called common cause failures (CCFs) and they defeat the use of redundant systems and spare 
parts, since all the identical systems or components can fail in the same way.  
Newly designed systems with limited testing often suffer infant mortality, since design and manufacturing errors 
cause failures during initial operation. Redesign or process change is then needed. Redundancy and spare parts 
cannot cure engineering mistakes. A system is made reliable either by making it very similar to earlier proven 
designs or by careful design and extensive testing. The number of CCFs is much higher for newly designed, recently 
redesigned, little tested, and relatively unused systems. Reliability analysis assuming total reparability is a too 
simple approach that produces an over-optimistic, best-case reliability estimate. It assumes that many typical causes 
of failure do not exist.  
B. Achieving high reliability using spares is implausible  
If it is assumed that systems can be kept operating by repairing failures using spare parts, it is easy to prove that 
very high reliability can be easily achieved using a reasonable additional mass of spares. Since this is not actually 
possible, the assumption must be incorrect.  
A typical real world hardware system has many components and subsystems with different mass and failure 
probability. There are often heavy sturdy components, frames and tanks and panels that have high mass and low 
failure rate. There are often small delicate components, filters and valves, that have low mass and high failure rate. 
The smaller, higher failure rate components usually have several spares provided to increase overall system 
reliability. Providing a small mass of spares can give a large increase in reliability. The ordinary design of systems 
produces components with reliability inversely related to mass and with maintenance based on lower mass spares.  
The extreme worst case of hardware design for a low mass of spares would be if each component had exactly the 
same mass and failure rate. We assume this worst case. Specifically, suppose a system has mass M and failure 
probability F. We divide it into N identical components each with mass M/N and failure probability F/M. We 
provide each component with R identical redundant units. Each component fails only if all R units fail, so the failure 
probability for redundancy of R is (F/N)R. The overall mass is R times the original mass and the overall failure 
probability is the sum of the failure rate for N sets of R components.  
 
Overall mass = R M 
 
Overall failure probability = N (F/N)R 
 
Component level repair using small spare parts would typically have the number of different replaceable parts, 
N, to be large. For any level of redundancy, R, even a reasonable R = 3, the overall failure probability approaches 
zero as N becomes large. For example, F = 0.1, R = 3, N = 100, overall failure probability = N (F/N)R = 10-7, one in 
10 million. Even for F = 0.1, R = 2 for an operating system and one spare, and only N = 10, overall failure 
probability is 10-3, one in a thousand. This seems very unrealistic for most real world hardware systems.  
Those who suggest the use of spares and low level repair for space life support systems are expecting the kind of 
reliability improvement that can be achieved if spares can repair all failures. The use of spares can repair the 
independent random failures assumed in the usual simple reliability model. These failures can all be repaired and the 
failure rate due to them can be driven down to zero. The problem is that many failures are not random and 
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independent, but are correlated common cause failures (CCFs) such as design errors and so cannot be cured by 
spares.  
Reliability calculations that assume all failures can be repaired using redundant spare parts are too optimistic. In 
the real world, CCFs strongly limit the gains of redundancy. New, relatively untested designs are especially difficult 
to make highly reliable. Assuming that space life support can be kept operational using spares and low level repair is 
clearly dubious and misleading.  
III. Mathematical models of reliability 
The usual most common mathematical model of reliability assumes that a working system has a constant failure 
rate due to unpredictable independent random failures. This model does not consider that systems often have a high 
initial failure rate, the so-called infant mortality, or that some components wear out, causing a high failure rate at 
end of life. This failure rate over time is sometimes described as the “bathtub curve,” initially high, decreasing to a 
constant low level, and then increasing to a high level.  
The initially decreasing failure rate is due to burn-in, to failure and replacement of defective components, and to 
detection and repair of design faults. The low constant failures during useful life are random events sometimes 
caused by external loads or stresses. The finally increasing failure rate can be caused by mechanical wear out or 
aging related to chemical or thermal stress. More than two-thirds of systems show infant mortality and then a 
constant failure rate, but no final aging period. (Hansen, 2001) Shuttle maintenance data show a rapid decrease of 
the failure rate to a then slowly decreasing baseline, but no later increase due to wear-out effects. (Shishko, 1995) If 
systems are well tested and designed to last several times the required operating life, their failure rates can be 
expected to be constant. 
Another frequently observed departure from the usually assumed low constant failure rate is the occurrence of 
clusters of or repeated common cause failures, which are not random or independent. A design error or requirement 
misunderstanding may cause repeated rapid failures of the same component or a sequential cause-and-effect chain of 
failures. Common cause failures are often a major factor in infant mortality. The gradual process of operating, 
trouble-shooting, and improving a system may lead to gradual reliability growth, a slow decline in the failure rate, 
over the operating life so the system.  
Fitting reliability data to a model is interesting in itself, but the major reason to establish a plausible model is to 
suggest reliability behavior beyond the data. We will discuss the constant failure rate model, the beta factor model 
for common cause failures, and Weibull model that, with different parameters, describes infant mortality, constant 
random failures, and wear out.  
A. The constant failure rate model 
We first assume a constant failure rate, λ, which is the number of times a component or system is expected to fail 
per unit time, given that it is currently still operating. The failure rate is sometimes given in failures per thousand or 
per million hours.  
The reliability, R(t), is the probability that the system does not fail before time t. If the failure rate, λ, is a 
constant, the reliability, R(t), is an exponential function.  
 
R(t) = e -λ t 
 
The cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the failure probability, F(t), is the probability that a system does fail 
before time t.  
 
F(t) = 1 - R(t) = 1 – e -λ t 
 
The failure probability density function (pdf), f(t), is the probability of failure over time.  
 
f(t) = dF(t)/dt = - dR(t)/dt = λ e -λ t  
 
This is the exponential probability distribution. The mean value of the exponential pdf is 1/λ. The variance is 
1/λ2. The median is ln(2)/λ  = 0.693/λ.  
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The Mean Time Before Failure (MTBF) is 1/λ, the mean value. The probability that the equipment will not fail 
before the MTBF is R(1/λ ) = e-1 = 0.63. A constant failure rate is a good model for the long flat "intrinsic failure" 
portion of the bathtub curve where early failures or wear out are not significant. 
B. The beta (β) factor Common Cause Failure (CCF) model  
A common cause failure (CCF) occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are 
either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two 
systems fail in the same way for the same reason but at different times. Common mode failures can occur because of 
a design defect and they reduce the dependability of systems that rely on repair using spare parts. 
The β factor method assumes that the fraction β of the overall failure probability is due to CCFs. That is, (1- β) F 
of the failures are random and β F are CCF’s. F is the total probability of the system failing due to all events, both 
independent and common cause. The beta factor model is the most frequently used common cause failure model. 
Large amounts of data have been gathered, especially on nuclear power systems. (Borcsok et al., 2007) (Bukowski 
and Goble, 2001) (Stotta et al.)  
1. Common cause failures and redundancy 
It seems possible to achieve high reliability for a system that has a reasonable initial failure probability F (say 
less than 0.1), by dividing the system into N subsystems and making each subsystem a redundant pair. Each of the N 
subsystems has a failure probability of F/N. A redundant pair of subsystems has failure probability (F/N)2, and the 
series of N pairs has failure probability N * (F/N)2 = F2 /N. For F = 0.1 and N = 10, F2 /N = 0.001.  
Suppose that the system has a common cause failure probability of β F. We assume that the system and all the 
spares fail if a CCF occurs. Dividing the system into N subsystems, each has a common cause failure probability of 
β F/N. A redundant pair of subsystems has failure probability (F/N)2  + β  F/N, and the series of N pairs has failure 
probability N * [(F/N) 2 + β  F/N] = F2 /N + β  F. The system failure rate cannot be reduced below the original 
common cause failure rate. For F = 0.1, β  = 0.1, and N = 10, F2 /N + β  F = 0.001 + 0.01 = 0.011. Achieving very 
high reliability using redundant pairs of subsystems seems possible if there are no common cause failures, but would 
be prevented by a high fraction of common cause failures.  
2. Common cause failures in shuttle 
 Rutledge and Mosleh identified the dependent and common cause failures in all the space shuttle in-flight 
anomalies that occurred during the first forty flights after the Challenger accident. Of 473 anomalies, 54 (11%) were 
judged to be common cause failures, 6 due to functional interaction, and 4 due to spatial interaction, for a total of 64 
(14%) dependent failures. The frequency of dependent and common cause failures is not significantly different from 
that found in nuclear power plants. (Rutledge and Mosleh, 1995)  
C. The Weibull time varying failure rate model 
The Weibull probability density function (pdf) of the failure times f(t) is:  
 
f(t) = (k/a) (t/a) k-1 e –(t/a) ^k 
 
In the Weibull pdf, k > 0 is the shape parameter and a > 0 is the time scale parameter of the distribution. For k = 
1, the Weibull distribution becomes the exponential distribution used above, with λ = 1/a.  
The Weibull distribution has a failure rate that is proportional to the k – 1 power of time, t. The value of k 
defines three reliability regimes.  
k < 1 corresponds to "infant mortality,” a failure rate decreasing over time.  
k = 1 indicates that the failure rate is constant over time.  
k > 1 indicates that the failure rate increases with time, possibly due to wear out. (Wikipedia, Weibull 
distribution) 
The parameter “a” is related to system lifetime and the MTBF. For k = 1, the constant failure rate case, a = 1/λ = 
MTBF. For general k, the expected system life is proportional to the inverse of the Weibull probability density 
function. For k > 1, the Weibull probability density function increases over time, so failures become more likely and 
the MTBF decreases over time. k > 1 indicates wear out and deteriorating reliability. For k < 1, the Weibull 
probability density function decreases over time, so that the MTBF increases over time. k > 1 indicates infant 
mortality and reliability growth. (Gaudard and Wright, 2016) 
The Weibull probability density function (pdf) has an instantaneous failure rate equal to: 
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v(t) = (k/a) (t//a) k-1 
 
For k = 1 and λ = 1/a, v(t) = λ , the constant failure rate of the exponential distribution. (Scholz, 2008) 
1. Weibull reliability plots 
Plots of the Weibull probability density function for different k are shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Weibull probability density functions.  
 
The failure probability density function is the number of failures expected at any particular time. As units fail 
and are removed from service, the number of failures drops to zero. All the Weibull pdf plots in Figure 1 have a = 1 
and roughly similar average lifetimes due to the long tails to the right of most of the pdfs. The case k = 1 
corresponds to a constant failure rate. That is, for k = 1, each system that is still operating has a constant probability 
of failure. Since the number of operating systems declines over time, the pdf of a system failure declines. The case k 
= 0.5 shows decreasing infant mortality or reliability growth. The case k = 1.5 shows wear out, reliability decreasing 
with time. The case k = 5 corresponds to an approximately constant limited life, with most failures occurring near 
time a = 1. Higher k narrows the pdf.  
Plots of the Weibull instantaneous failure rate for different k are shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2. Weibull failure rates.  
 
The failure rate is the probability that any one operating unit fails. In Figure 2, k = 0.5 shows decreasing failure 
rate, k = 1 constant failure rate, and k = 1.5 shows failure rate increasing with time. For k = 5, The failure rate 
increases very rapidly as the life limit is approached.  
Figure 3 shows a composite Weibull pdf that models the bathtub curve reliability behavior sometimes observed 
over time. 
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Figure 3. A composite Weibull pdf with a bathtub curve failure rate.  
 
The composite Weibull pdf first shows a rapidly declining failure rate. Then the failure rate and pdf increase but 
the pdf then declines because few systems are still operating.  
D. Applying the reliability models 
The purpose of theoretical models is to help understand reality. How do these models apply to engineering 
experience? We consider components, assemblies, and complex systems.  
1. Component reliability 
Components such as integrated circuits are often tested in large groups to determine their failure rates and 
lifetimes. They often have constant failure rates per unit over time, k = 1. They may be tested at high temperature to 
identify life limiting flaws and then show wear out, k > 1. If design or manufacturing errors cause infant mortality, k 
< 1, the components may be subjected to burn-in before being used. Some components such as adsorbent beds or 
catalytic converters are simply used up over time and have a characteristic life time in hours or cycles, k >> 1. 
Components have relatively few failure modes so their reliability data often fits one of the simple models in Figure 
1. Components are often operated until failure and then replaced. Assemblies and systems may be maintained or 
repaired as well as replaced.  
2. Assembly reliability 
Assemblies such as pumps have multiple components such as motors, bearings, valves, filters, and seals, so they 
have multiple failure modes. Like components, they can be tested in large groups to determine their failure rates and 
lifetimes. Their failure data can show the full bathtub curve behavior, infant morality, a long duration low constant 
failure rate, and increasing final wear out. Some components may have a short limited life or require midlife 
scheduled maintenance, such as replacing filters, seals, or bearings.  
3. Complex system reliability 
Operational hardware that provides service to users can be a complex system, consisting of several assemblies 
and many components. An automobile is a complex, highly reliable system that can have infant morality, a long low 
constant failure rate with occasional repairs and periodic scheduled maintenance, and then final wear out. The user 
of automobiles wants cost effective and reliable transportation and can optimize. Suppose the user is the manager of 
a company owned fleet of taxis or loaners. The users can buy a group of all identical automobiles and accept the 
composite bathtub reliability behavior, or they can continually replace the worst performing ones with similar new 
models to obtain an approximately constant failure (and repair cost) rate. An individual or family might keep a spare 
car or rely on sharing or public transportation if a car is in the shop. At the highest user level, it is the reliability of 
the user service that is critical, not the reliability of any particular system. The user may be served by a system of 
systems, including alternate hardware and procedural work-arounds. The multiple assemblies in composite systems 
may have different failure modes and their failure rates and pdfs may have complex time plots.  
4. International Space Station (ISS) life support system reliability  
The International Space Station (ISS) life support system was designed to be maintained using spare assemblies 
called Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs). The number of spares made available is based on the failure rates, which 
have been determined using manufacturers’ estimates and operational experience. Some ORUs have been identified 
as having limited life and are replaced by schedule. The reliability model used for ISS thus includes constant failure 
rates and limited life or wear out, but not infant mortality and common cause failures. However, the usual simple 
reliability model that assumes a low constant failure rate does not seem appropriate for ISS systems such as life 
support. The systems designers explicitly relied on on-board repair and so did not implement the intensive design 
effort and conduct the extensive testing needed to eliminate most infant mortality and common cause failures. In 
some cases the failure rate and required number of spares have been higher than originally anticipated. The ISS 
system development approach seems excessively ambitious, with exaggerated hopes of engineering capability, 
funding, schedule, and good luck. The work is amazingly hard, expensive, long, and complex. Providing life support 
for the ISS crew has depended on systems of systems effects, such as supplies of material and spare parts from 
Earth, reducing crew size and support, and relying on the Russian life support system.  
5. Mars life support system reliability  
The ISS life support system is the only operational recycling US life support system ever flown in space. It 
provides valuable lessons for Mars transit life support. (Bagdigian et al., 2015-094), (Takada et al, 2015-115) and 
others have suggested that life support systems similar to those on ISS can be used for Mars transit, although with 
extensive redesign to correct known problems. Redesigning and upgrading systems flying on ISS seems especially 
slow and difficult, especially compared to improving the space shuttle, which was landed and refurbished after each 
flight. It seems possible that ISS redesigns will introduce a second generation of design errors that will require 
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further time and effort to correct. It seems very difficult to conduct sufficient testing to eliminate infant mortality 
and common cause failures. If the estimated failure rate is unrealistically low, or if the likelihood of common cause 
failures is ignored, the number of spares provided will be too low to keep the systems operational throughout the 
Mars mission.  
As difficult as it is to redesign the systems now operating on ISS, it will be nearly impossible to redesign systems 
in transit to Mars. Repairs will have to be accomplished with spares and tools already on board. Making this possible 
requires an intensive design effort and extensive testing to eliminate most infant mortality and common cause 
failures.  
Since it is impossible to receive materials, spares, and new assemblies on the way to Mars, and since the crew 
cannot return if life support fails, Mars transit has much higher risk than ISS. Mars transit life support must be much 
more reliable than ISS life support. The engineering approach should be much more conservative, safe, constrained, 
and technically unambitious. A user focused systems of systems reliability approach similar to that used on ISS 
should be employed. It could include high reliability systems, stored materials, diverse hardware, and perhaps 
contingency responses. Using the too simple low constant failure rate reliability model could lead to disaster.  
IV. International Space Station (ISS) Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) reliability  
What does the International Space Station (ISS) life support system reliability data show? Can the reliability 
models provide insight? We consider the Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) now on the International Space 
Station (ISS).  
A. Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) reliability data 
Two papers summarize the failure and maintenance events of the OGA now on the ISS. (Takada et al., 2015-115 
(Bagdigian et al., 2015-094). The operational problems reported in these papers were consolidated and categorized 
as shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) operational failures and maintenance events. 
 
Year H2 sensor Cell stack ACTEX TOC Other Year total 
2009 4 5 0 0 5 14 
2010 4 6 0 3 19 32 
2011 3 0 2 0 12 17 
2012 5 0 2 1 6 14 
2013 4 0 0 0 8 12 
2014 4 0 1 0 6 11 
Totals 24 11 5 4 56 100 
 
TOC is total organic carbon. The data of Table 1 is plotted in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) operational failures and maintenance events.  
 
Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) problems show an initial increase, partly due to the cell stack problem, 
and then a gradual decrease. Table 1 and Figure 4 show the number of failures per year in a single operating system, 
so the plotted number of problems corresponds to the OGA system failure rate. A failure rate increase followed by a 
decrease is the direct up-side-down inverse of the traditional bathtub curve shown in Figure 3. The OGA failure rate 
can be approximated using two of the Weibull failure rate curves in Figure 2, a constant failure rate, k = 1, and an 
early, years 2009-2010, limited life bell curve, k > 1. These are characteristic of the hydrogen (H2) sensor and cell 
stack problems respectively. We clearly have an unusual reliability case. The hydrogen (H2) sensor, cell stack, 
ACTEX, TOC, and other problems are discussed.  
 
1. Hydrogen sensor degradation 
The hydrogen sensors are triple redundant. Hydrogen sensor replacement was scheduled at 150 day intervals 
because of calibration limits. Some hydrogen sensors had excessive drift and this was accommodated by an 
operational procedure change. Improper sensor readings were tolerated if only one of the three sensors failed. 
Because of this decision, hydrogen sensor replacements have not been necessary before the originally scheduled 150 
day intervals. The hydrogen sensor replacements occur about twice per year, but they have required other 
maintenance attention. The hydrogen sensor replacement, maintenance, and calibration included 24 of the 100 
failures and maintenance events. A design change is planned to replace the hydrogen sensors by a hydrogen-oxygen 
recombiner.  
The hydrogen sensor replacement occurs at the constant scheduled rate and is not a failure response. The failures 
are not of great concern. However, they do indicate an unanticipated design deficiency that caused a sequence of 
common cause failures and requires a significant redesign using a new approach. Common cause failures and 
redesigns are indications of an immature design, one containing undetected flaws because it was insufficiently tested 
before operation.  
2. The cell stack failure 
The most significant problem was the cell stack degradation and failure. Initially, the OGA recirculating loop 
pressure increased, apparently because the filters were clogged, and the filters and the Water ORU were replaced, 
ultimately using new design filters. The problem continued and high pH was noted in the OGA recirculating loop. 
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This seemed to produce corrosion products that clogged the loop filters. Ultimately the cell stack failed. The failure 
mechanism was as follows: the electrolysis cell membranes typically degrade, they produce acid and low pH, this 
caused corrosion products that blocked the filters and contaminated the cell membranes, this increased their 
resistance, driving up the voltage to the shutdown limit.  
The electrolysis cell stack was replaced. Filters, the pump ORU, and the water ORU had been replaced during 
trouble shooting. After these replacements, the cell stack problem was finally cured by adding a new deionization 
bed into the water recirculating loop to remove the acid and contaminants. This deionizing bed is the ACTEX, for 
Activated Carbon/Ion Exchange.  
The cell stack failure group includes 11 of the 100 failures and maintenance events. They all occurred during the 
first year and a half of full operation. The ACTEX replacement events in subsequent years represent continuing 
effects of the cell stack failure.  
The cell stack failure was not infant mortality, it occurred over 18 months, and represents an unanticipated form 
of wear out. This is another classic case of a sequence of common cause failures that was due to a design error and 
that could only be cured by a significant design change. Takeda et al. noted that, “Published literature for fuel cell 
technology identified that there is a known chemical degradation of the cell membrane polymer chain end groups 
during normal operation.” More extensive initial research and ground testing might have discovered this problem 
before flight. (Takada et al, 2015-115)  
3. The ACTEX bed 
The ACTEX deionizing bed required installing and several replacements. The difficult task of modifying a flight 
system was made necessary by the cell stack degradation problem. The ACTEX actions include 11 of the 100 
replacement and maintenance events. Adding the ACTEX is a redesign required by the cell stack failure, and can be 
traced to the same design oversight and failure to test.  
4. Total organic carbon (TOC) 
The total organic carbon (TOC) in the recirculating loop sometimes increases, apparently randomly, and 
probably due to contamination of the feed water. The TOC can be reduced by replacement of the ACTEX deionizing 
bed. It is proposed to add a new capability to periodically refresh the recirculation loop water using a bleed 
procedure to directly reduce TOC. The TOC actions include 4 of the 100 replacement and maintenance events. Not 
anticipating the need to refresh the OGA recirculating loop is a specification oversight, as coping with contaminated 
feed water was not included.  
5. Other maintenance events 
The other maintenance events in Table 1 and Figure 3 include 56 of the 100 events. They follow the same time 
pattern as the sum of the hydrogen sensor, cell stack, ACTEEX, and TOC problems, an initial increase in the first 
two years and then decrease. Many of the other problems are related to the hydrogen, cell stack, ACTEEX, and TOC 
problems. 18 of the 56 events are repair or replacing ORUs, and the other 38 are trouble shooting including water 
sampling and cleaning.  
B. Modeling and discussion of OGA failure data results 
The OGA failure results are related to the Weibull model and their implications for Mars life support are 
discussed. 
1. Weibull modeling  
Figure 5 plots the OGA failure replacement data without the scheduled hydrogen sensor replacements. 
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Figure 5. OGA failure replacements with a Weibull rate fit.  
 
The data plotted earlier in Figure 4 contains 50 component and ORU replacements. 21 of these are scheduled 
hydrogen sensor replacements that occur at the constant rate of three or four per year, and which are not shown in 
Figure 5. Only the other 29 failed component and ORU replacements are shown in Figure 5. The Weibull rate fit has 
two segments. The initial increase is fitted to the Weibull failure rate equation with k = 1.83, corresponding to wear 
out, and a = 2009.5, mid 2009. The later year data has a roughly constant failure rate, k = 1, and less than one 
replacement per year.  
The initial high failure rate was largely due to the slowly developing cell stack degradation problem and looks 
like an early wear out or a dampened infant morality. The initial high failure rate era extended for two years, longer 
than a Mars round trip, and was followed by many years with low constant failure rate, as is usually expected after 
initial burn in.  
2. We can’t count on repairing all failures going to Mars 
Half or more of the Oxygen Generation Assembly problems are due to design errors and common cause failures 
that more typically appear during initial operation, infant mortality, burn in, or debugging. These include the 
hydrogen sensor, cell stack, ACTEEX, and TOC problems and led to many of the other events, such as water 
sampling, loop flushing, and cleaning. Well-designed and tested mature systems typically have less than 10% of 
failures due to a common cause. It is practically unheard of to have a level of 50% common cause failures, and this 
suggests that insufficient attention was paid to design and test.  
The large percentage of common cause failures seen here definitely contradicts the usual engineering assumption 
that most failures are random and independent and so can be effectively repaired using spare parts. We can’t count 
on repairing all failures going to Mars. Design errors require redesign, which is not done with identical spares.  
3. Can we use the ISS Oxygen Generation Assembly for Mars?  
An interesting idea that has been suggested is to use the planned redesigned ISS Oxygen Generation Assembly 
for Mars transit. (Takeda, et al., 2015-115) The active operational duration of a Mars transit mission is about 15 
months, possibly interrupted by a long crew surface stay. Suppose that the original ISS OGA had been flown to 
Mars. Since the cell stack operated for 18 months on ISS, it would not have failed during the Mars transit. And 
presumably, as on ISS, there would have been a spare cell stack in case of failure. However there would have been 
the time consuming and worrisome problems caused by cell stack degradation. The ACTEX has fixed this problem. 
However, the ISS OGA reliability is not high and the planned redesigns may introduce new problems.  
The selection and design of an oxygen system for Mars is a complex systems engineering problem. Oxygen 
electrolysis has a hydrogen safety hazard and similar Russian systems have failed. The ISS OGA has high mass, 
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probably higher than the mass of the oxygen that it would produce on a Mars transit. (Jones, 2016-103) The ISS 
OGA is planned to have extensive redesign, which almost always introduces new errors. Alternate approaches have 
been considered in the past, and probably should be revisited.  
4. Should we use the ISS life support development approach for Mars?  
The ISS reliability and maintenance approach are not suitable for Mars. The ISS resources for design and testing 
were limited, probably too much so. It was decided to rely on crew repair, the Russian systems, and resupply and 
abort responses only available in low Earth orbit.  
Mars life support needs thorough design and long testing to provide and demonstrate much higher reliability than 
ISS has had. We cannot assume, as did ISS, that newly designed or redesigned systems with little testing and limited 
trouble-free operational experience can be successfully operated by relying on repair using spare parts. Traditional 
NASA systems engineering is needed to reduce risk and provide cost effective safe operation.  
V. Conclusions 
It is often assumed that system failures during operations can always be repaired. This is the highly optimistic 
best case, corresponding to a reliable, mature, well-tested design. Analysis assuming all failures can be repaired can 
be useful, especially if it proves a system is insufficiently reliable because it requires excessive spares, repairs, and 
maintenance. But this analysis is not sufficient to prove a system will be reliable, since the assumption of complete 
reparability can be false.  
Design errors happen, and using redundant systems or repairing systems using spares cannot fundamentally cure 
them. Redundancy and repair using spares can be defeated by design errors, external events, manufacturing errors, 
and other kinds of common cause failures.  
The International Space Station (ISS) Oxygen Generation Assembly (OGA) experienced a group of common 
cause failures that were due to an oversight and required a design change. Cell membrane degradation over time was 
known in the literature and would have been found by a reasonably long preflight ground test. It was fixed by a 
design change that provided filtration to remove degradation products.  
If a system design error causes a failure on the way to Mars, it can’t be fixed by repairing the system using 
spares. Assuming that all failures can be repaired using spares has high risk for systems that are new or redesigned 
and lack extensive testing and operational experience 
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